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Herbicide labels specify the legal use of the herbicide and the conditions of 
warranty.  If the user follows the label instructions, including appropriate application 
rates, the herbicide company has certain guarantees regarding weed control and crop 
injury. Companies establish label rates to be efficacious for a range of conditions rather 
than for average or ideal conditions. This allows the weed control to be effective in most 
circumstances and minimizes the risk that weed control fails and the user files a claim.  
Individual field weed pressure and the prevalence of factors that affect herbicide 
efficacy are unknown to the herbicide manufacturer but known to the user at the time of 
application.  The user has better information than the manufacturer (asymmetric 
information opportunity).  Weather conditions, soil conditions, and weed species and 
stage of development all affect the efficacy of herbicide applications and are better 
known by the farmer than the manufacturer.   
Reduced rates of herbicide, while shown effective by university field trials, might 
nullify the warranty because the rates may not conform to the label instructions.  
Farmers with different utility functions and better local information have an opportunity 
to reduce herbicide rates to increase net income and reduce the total quantity of 
herbicides released into the environment.   
This paper examines the role of risk aversion in setting herbicide label rates and 
application rates.  This is a concept paper containing no data.  It is intended to present a 
model that could be tested and give policy direction, assuming the model is accurate. 
Labeled rate, as used in this paper, is the rate given on a herbicide label as 
providing weed control for the specified weeds.  Label rates occasionally contain ranges that differ for specified conditions.  For example, atrazine 4L is labeled at 3 pt/acre on 
coarse soils and 4 pt/acre on medium soils (Kendig and Johnson). 
Many studies have shown that reduced rates of herbicides can provide adequate 
weed control and crop yields in various production systems.  Conventional and no-till 
systems have been evaluated (DeFelice et al.; Johnson et al. 1997,1998).  Soil-applied 
and postemergence herbicides have been evaluated (Devlin et al.; Prostko and Meade).  
Trials have been done on soybeans (Johnson et al. 1998), grain sorghum (Rosales-
Robles, et al.), wheat (Lockhart and Howatt,) and corn (Donald et al.). 
Applying reduced rates of herbicides can also be done via zone application by 
banding low herbicide rates between and over corn rows (less than normal rate but 
different amounts between vs over corn rows) (Donald, et al.). 
Many of these studies have indicated that the use of reduced rates has the 
potential to increase profitability (Donald, et al.; Rosales-Robles, et al.; Dirks, et al.). 
Many of these and other weed control articles indicate that yield is reduced with 
relatively few weed escapes, depending on the weed.  Complete weed control is the 
objective. 
Antidotal evidence indicates that crop producers are hesitant to apply herbicides 
at reduced rates. This raises the question of “why is the number of farmers that apply 
reduced rates of herbicides low?”  Several possibilities exist.  First, farmers may not be 
aware of the research and merely following the recommendations of their input 
suppliers.  Alternatively, farmers may think that the increased cost of a possible second, 
rescue, treatment exceeds the reduced cost associated with reduced application rates. Several sources of risk exist.  The initial reduced rate may not give sufficient 
weed control.  Rescue treatments may control weeds but not before a real or perceived 
reduction in yield occurs.  Weather conditions could reduce the opportunity to apply 
herbicides in rescue treatment.  Knowledge of the field and environmental conditions is 
essential for reducing risk associated with reduced rates of herbicides. 
Herbicide performance is affected by weeds infesting the field, rainfall, soil type, 
temperature and many other environmental factors.  Soil applied herbicides are 
dependent on weed species, percent organic matter and soil texture. (Kendig and 
Johnson).  It is assumed that farmers have knowledge of the weeds infesting the field, 
soil type, organic matter and soil texture.  Their knowledge of these conditions allows 
them to better determine what rate would be appropriate, if rate efficacy information is 
available.  Labels often mention rates for different types of soils characteristics, such as 
organic matter, soil texture and pH. 
Model 
From the literature, it is hypothesized that weed control efficacy increases as 
quantity of the active ingredient in the herbicide increases until the plateau is reached 
(see figure 1 panel a). The plateau is hypothesized to be long because of the 
prevalence of studies indicating the reduced rates of herbicide provide weed control 
similar to label rates.   
Weeds control is for the purpose of increasing yield of the commodity being 
produced so the weed control efficacy function is transformed into a production function 
as in figure 1 panel b. Stage II is exhibited until the plateau is reached.  While the weed 
control efficacy function did not reach stage III, the yield production function would.  Excessive herbicides have the ability to injure the crop for which they are labeled 
(Gunsolus and Curran).  Because incomplete weed control has the ability to significantly 
reduce yields, the production function is kinked near the plateau. 
Farmers using herbicides are purchasing weed control events.  They purchase a 
weed control event to insure production unreduced by weed pressure. The weed control 
event is the labeled rate of herbicide.  It will be shown later that the labeled rate or weed 
control event rate, Q, lies somewhere on the plateau of the production function.  The 
concept that herbicide companies sell weed control events, rather than herbicides per 
se, is critical to understanding the model.   
The herbicide company can set the label rate of the herbicide anywhere on the 
plateau to achieve max weed control subject to the limits that the label rate has been 
approved by the federal regulatory agencies. The regulatory agency views documents 
provided by the company on the impact of the chemical on human health and the 
environment.  Label rates are scrutinized by the regulatory agency for their impact on 
the environment rather than for their efficacy.  The company does not have to prove that 
the label rate is the lowest rate at which weed control is achieved. The regulatory 
agency is concerned that the maximum rate permitted does no harm to the environment 
or human health. 
The Herbicide Company Decision 
Their objective function is to maximize profit by selling weed control events. 
(1)  rX PQ− = Π ; 
where Π is profit; P is the price of a weed control event; Q = the number of weed 
control events sold; r is a vector of input costs and X is a vector of inputs. The company sells in an imperfectly competitive market where the quantity of weed control events 
sold is affected by price of the event and competitor’s weed control event products. 
(2)  0 / < ∂ ∂ P Q  
The quantity of herbicide active ingredient, q, necessary for a weed control event, 
Q, is the relevant question of this paper.  If the quantity necessary to provide an 
effective weed control event lies on the plateau of the production function 
then 0 / = ∂ ∂ q Q . 
The impact of q on profit is unknown.  Profit decreases as the pounds of active 
ingredient sold increases because the company is selling weed control events rather 
than product.  More active ingredient per weed control event costs the company more. 
However, it is hypothesized that the marginal cost of an additional unit of active 
ingredient approaches zero.  The full cost of the herbicide is hypothesized to consist 
predominantly of research and development, and marketing and distribution expenses.  
Active ingredient is relatively inexpensive.  Therefore, the marginal cost is assumed so 
small as to have negligible affect the choice of q.  Profit could decrease with q, if 
unsatisfactory weed control results in loss of market or high warranty fulfillment costs. 
It is also assumed that the herbicide company is risk averse, having a concave 
utility function with respect to profit. The uncertainty of the exact specification of the 
weed efficacy function gives greater uncertainty to Q near the rate where the plateau 
begins (illustrated by high/low points on figure 1, panel a).  Selecting a rate, q, near the 
left side of the plateau increases the risk of a poor weed control event, Q. Selecting q 
towards the right side of the plateau gives greater certainty that weed control will be 
successful under the greatest number of environmental and production scenarios.  Increasing the certainty of Q, reduces the probability that a farmer will have 
unsatisfactory weed control and file for damages. 
However, if the herbicide company sets the label rate too far on the right of the 
weed efficacy function the risk of herbicide injury increases. (Note: this also increases 
cost but, as mentioned earlier, the marginal cost is sufficiently low as not to be a 
determining factor in setting the rate).  As the probability of crop injury occurs, the 
probability that farmers will file for damages increases. 
The risk of incomplete control or of crop injury causes the herbicide company to 
select the label rate somewhere along the plateau.  They will try to balance the 
probabilities and cost of each type of damage to set a rate that minimizes expected 
costs.  If the herbicide company had perfect information of each specific use, it could set 
the application rate lower.  But with imperfect information, the rate is set to 
accommodate most circumstances. 
The Farmer Decision 
The farmer is assumed to maximize profit of crops grown.  Yield, Y, is a function 
of q, as illustrated in figure 1, panel b. 
(3)  0 / ≥ ∂ ∂ q Y  
Cost also is a function of q.  While the cost of ingredients to make q are minor to 
the company in an imperfectly competitive market, the cost of the weed control, C, is a 
more important factor to the farmer.   
(4)  0 / > ∂ ∂ q C .   
Selecting rates of herbicide above (below) the label rate will increase (decrease) 
the weed control cost to the farmer.  The farmer has incentive to decrease q while obtaining a good weed control event.  The savings associated with reduced rates of 
herbicide, S, will be the cost of herbicide, H, times the difference between the labeled 
rate, Rl and the reduced rate, Rr. 
(5)  ) ( r l R R H S − × =  
If q is prior to the plateau, yield responds positively to more q because of greater 
weed control. If q is on the plateau, yield will not respond to increase q because weed 
control is complete.  Because the company sets the label rate for q on the plateau and 
because increasing q increases cost to the farmer, a farmer will have no incentive to 
increase the rate of herbicide beyond Rl.  However, there is a range of Q, below the 
label rate, where the farmer can reduce q without decreasing weed control or yields.  
Farmers have an economic incentive to reduce herbicide rates in this range. 
Two factors indicate that farmers could reduce rates without adversely affecting 
efficacy.  First, published studies indicate that reduced rates are possible without 
reducing efficacy.  The published field trials were done under varying environmental 
conditions and production systems, indicating that reduced rates can give good weed 
control without reducing yield.  The company apparently has set the labeled rate far 
enough to the right of the beginning of Q, to permit weed control in many situations at 
levels lower than the label rate. (Note: trials that do not support reduced rates may not 
be as likely to be published so the presence of reduced rates studies does not 
necessarily mean that they work in all situations). 
Second, farmers know certain conditions that affect efficacy and can adjust their 
rates accordingly.  Given their knowledge of the size of weeds at spraying, the soil 
properties of their fields, the environmental conditions affecting herbicide efficacy, they can reduce the quantity of herbicide applied if the conditions indicate good conditions of 
successful weed control.  Local knowledge gives the opportunity for more efficient rate 
decisions. 
Farmer adjusted herbicide rates may fail because of 1) optimism bias where the 
farmer believes the field conditions to be better than they are, and 2) imperfect, though 
better than the herbicide company, information regarding the environmental conditions 
during herbicide uptake by the targeted weeds.  Weed control failure could happen with 
labeled rates but is more likely to happen with reduced rates.   
Several costs of weed control when using reduced rates exists.  A rescue 
treatment may be necessary.  The rescue treatment would have the cost of application, 
A, and additional herbicide product, R2.  Rescue treatments may not occur soon enough 
to prevent yield loss so Ly, yield loss due to delayed treatment, if any becomes a cost.  
Adverse weather conditions (rain keeping the sprayer out of the field or poor growing 
conditions reducing adsorption of the product) are the major factors creating untimely 
events.   
(6)  ) ( 2 y r L R A P C + + = ,  
where Pr is the probability that a rescue treatment becomes necessary. 
Finally, reduced rates may void the warranty of the herbicide company.  Some 
failures are going to occur even with the use of label rates.  The reduced rate may not 
have been the cause of the weed control failure but it means that the farmer, rather than 
the herbicide company, will bear the cost.  
If the farmer is risk neutral, the decision of whether to apply labeled rates or 
reduced rates would be a simple analysis of savings and cost.  If expected savings is greater than expected cost, reduced rates would be preferred by the rational risk neutral 
decision maker.   
The weed science literature suggests that risk neutral decision makers would be 
using reduced rates of herbicides.  Current lack of use of reduced rates of herbicides 
indicates that the farmer is risk averse, with a concave utility function, regarding 
herbicide decisions.  Applying herbicide at the labeled rate gives a certain outcome – 
weed control will be satisfactory or the company warranty will cover losses due to 
failure.  Applying herbicide at reduced rates is a risky action – some probability exists of 
saving the cost of herbicide not needed and some probability exists of having 
unsatisfactory weed control not covered by the herbicide company warranty. 
Figure 2 illustrates the utility associated with the choice.   Rl Π  is the certain 
outcome associated with use of labeled rates;  Rr Π is the savings that would occur by 
successfully using reduced rates;  2 R Π is the expense that would be incurred with 
unsatisfactory control requiring a rescue treatment.   R Π  is the expected value of the 
risky action. The difference between  Rl Π  and  R Π is the risk premium.  The farmer is 
willing to forego the additional expected value for the certain outcome of using labeled 
rates.   
The presence of a risk premium indicates that more herbicide is being used than 
would be necessary on the average.  Analysis of the risk premium gives an indication of 
the amount of herbicides that is released into the environment for “insurance, non-weed 
control” purposes.  If the risk premium could be reduced, herbicides released into the 
environment could be reduced. Assuming that the utility function of the farmer is fixed, reducing herbicide escape 
into the environment requires reducing the risk premium by reducing the probability of 
an unfavorable event or of the cost of the unfavorable event.  Several alternatives exist 
for to reduce the cost of unsatisfactory control to farmers. 
First, better information could be supplied by the herbicide companies and 
university researchers into the factors affecting herbicide efficacy.  This information 
could be used in plant growth models to more precisely determine application rates, 
reducing the risk of necessary rescue treatments, Pr.  This alternative requires that the 
transactions costs of knowing and using information be reduced.  Computer power has 
reduced the transactions cost and may be approaching a level where individual 
advisories can be provided to individual farmers.   
Because herbicide release into the environment is an externality which the 
farmer currently does not incur, there have been some projects funded by governments 
to subsidize the cost of rescue treatments should they be necessary. One project in the 
Route J watershed of Missouri guaranteed farmers who used ½ rates of atrazine that 
any necessary subsequent applications would be paid by the state.  During 3 years of 
the project, rescue treatments were never used.  Atrazine levels were significantly 
reduced in the drinking water reservoir and the state incurred no cost associated with 
additional treatments.   
As an alternative to government programs, insurance companies could offer 
policies that cover loss due to reduced rates.  It is hypothesized that the transaction cost 
and opportunity for moral hazard are too great for such policies to be effective. Conclusions 
Reduced rates of herbicide currently may not be optimal for the farmer for 
several reasons. First, the chemical is inexpensive and the label rate, though more than 
necessary for control, is an inexpensive way to insure that subsequent weed control 
measures are unnecessary. Second, risk averse farmers want the warranty that 
accompanies the use of herbicides according to the label.  
If application rates could be reduced, farm income might rise and the quantity of 
herbicides released in the environment might be reduced – both desirable outcomes not 
obtained given the current structure of labeling and warranties.  The reduction of 
transaction costs and concern of government entities to reduce herbicides in water may 
offer some means of more accurately determining herbicide application rates. Figure 1. Weed control efficacy function and yield production function Figure 2. Expected Utility and Risk Premium of Herbicide Rate Decision. 
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